Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1957

Ida M. Johnson v. Arthur Hardman : Brief of
Defendant and Appellant Arthur Hardman
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Hanson, Baldwin & Allen; Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Johnson v. Hardman, No. 8647 (Utah Supreme Court, 1957).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2795

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

:UNIVERSITY UTAH

NOV1

1957

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
IDA M. JOHNSON, Administra- ;
trix of the estate of C. Tennyson
Johnson, Deceased.
Plaintiff and Respondent,

Clerk, Su;:>romo C. ·

vs.

AR'THUR HARDMAN, dba
HARDMAN AUTO SALES,
NATHAN CHILD and
BARRUS MOTOR COMPANY,
Defendant and Appellant.

No. 8647

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT
ARTHUR HARDMAN

& ALLEN
Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant Arthur Hardman

HANSON, BALDWIN

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

SUBJECT INDEX
Page
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1

ST.A:TEMENT OF FACTS --------------------------------------------

3

STATEMENT OF POINTS --------------------------------------------

5

ARGUMENT ----------------------------------------------------------------------

6

POINT I. THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES AS A
MATTER OF LAW THAT THE DEFENDANT
NATHAN CHILD WAS NOT DRIVING SAID
PICKUP TRUCK AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT AS THE AGENT OR SERVANT OF
THE DEFENDANT ARTHUR HARDMAN.________

6

POINT II. THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS ON THE LAW AND BY FAILING TO
SUBMIT TO THE JURY THE DEFENDANT
HARDMAN'S THEORY OF THE CASE. ____________

18

CONCLUSION--------------------------------------------------------------------

25

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Coleman v. Bent, 100 Conn. 527, 124 Atl. 224 ____________

17

Conklin v. Walsh, 113 Utah 276, 193 P. 2d 437 ____________

13

Davis v. Semloh Hotel, Inc., 86 Utah 318, 44 P. 2d 689

12

Derrick v. Salt Lake & Ogden Ry. Co., 50 Utah 573,
168 P. 335 --------------------------------------------------------------------

15

Dowsett v. Dowsett, 116 Utah 12, 207 P. 2nd 809 ________

14

Fox v. Lavender, 89 Utah 115, 56 P. 2d 1049 ____________ 13, 16
Foxley v. Gallagher, 55 Utah 289, 185 P. 77 ---------------Galarowicz v. Ward, 230 P. 2d 576, 119 Utah 611 ________

16
13

Heaston v. Martinez, 3 Utah 2d 259, 282 P. 833 ----------

7

Jackson v. James, 97 Utah 41, 89 P. 2d 235 ---------------- 6, 7
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX-Continued
Page
Jones v. C. I. Trust, 64 Utah 151, 228 P. 896 ____________ 10, 12
Startin v. Madsen, 120 Utah 631, 237 P. 2d 834 ____________

22

Taylor v. Daynes, 118 Utah 61, 218 P. 2d 1069 ____________

12

'TEXTS
31 A.L.R. 2d 1455 ------------------------------------------------------------ 15
Restatement of the Law of Torts, Vol. 2, Sec. 491 ________

17

Utah Code Annotated 1953, Sec. 41-1-72 --------------------

6

Utah Code Annotated 1953, Sections 60-2-2,
60-2-3 ______________________________________________________________________ 9, 22, 24

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
IDA M. JOHNSON, Administratrix of the estate of C. Tennyson
Johnson, Deceased.
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

No. 8647

ARTHUR HARDMAN, dba
HARDMAN AUTO SALES,
NATHAN CHILD and
BARRUS MOTOR COMPANY,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT
ARTHUR HARDMAN

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
On December 20, 1955, Nathan Child was driving a 1951 International Pickup Truck east on
Highway 40, approximately 10 miles west of Salt
1
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Lake City when the vehicle suddenly veered from
the south center of the highway to the north side,
where it collided with an automobile driven by one
George Williams, in which C. Tennyson Johnson
was riding, resulting in fatal injuries to him. The
plaintiff as the administratrix of his estate brought
an action to recover damages against Nathan Child,
Arthur Hardman, dba Hardman Auto Sales and
Barrus Motor Company. The suit was brought
against Hardman as a defendant on the theory that
Child was his servant or agent and against Barrus
Motor Company on the theory that the steering apparatus and the wheels of the vehicle were in a
defective condition, which the Barrus Motor Company knew or should have known.
The allegations of negligence were denied by
all three defendants. Hardman also denied that
Child was his agent or servant.
At the close of the evidence the court, upon motion, dismissed the Barrus Motor Company from
the action. The jury returned a verdict in favor
of the plaintiff and against the defendants Hardman and Child in the sum of $43,628.23.
This appeal is taken by the defendant Hardman upon the grounds that there was no evidence
to submit to the jury on the issue of whether Child
was his servant or agent and that his motion for
2
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a directed verdict of no cause of action should have
been granted. He also contends that the court erroneously gave certain instructions and refused to
give others.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant Hardman is a resident of Sunset, Utah, where he operated a garage and a used
car lot ( R. 35). The defendant Child had known
Hardman for some time before December 20, 1955
(the date of the accident). They were friends and
Child had purchased cars from him in the past.
Sometime before the date of the accident Child told
Hardman that he was interested in buying a used
pickup truck. ( R. 26). Sometime after, Hardman
informed Child that he thought he had located a
pickup in Tooele, Utah, which might interest him
and arrangements were made for Child to accompany Hardman on the trip to Tooele in order that
he could see the vehicle ( R. 26). They drove from
Sunset to Tooele in Hardman's wrecker truck (R.
21). Hardman did not pay Child to make the trip,
nor did Child pay any of the trip expense (R. 26).
The pickup truck was an International '51.
It looked "pretty good" to Child. They took the
truck on a test run, observed that there were some
defects, consisting of broken glass and the oil pump
and speedometer were not functioning properly
(R. 27). Child told Hardman if these defects were
3
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repaired, he would buy the truck ( R. 28) . The repairs were made to Child's satisfaction and he told
Hardman he would accept it (R. 28 and 40). The
Agreed purchase price before they left Tooele was
$650.00 (R. 30, 40), of which Child intended
to pay Hardman $500.00 when he returned to Sunset, plus the trade-in value of a 1941 Ford, that
Hardman would give Child credit for the $150.00
balance which he would pay in about ninety days
( R. 30). In the course of this conversation Hardman
told Child that he would not pay Barrus Motor
Company for the car unless he (Child) would take
it as he didn't want it in his stock (R. 27, 31, 40).
Hardman paid Barrus Motor Company $600.00 for
the pickup, received the Certificate of Title from
them but not the registration certificate (R. 36,
41-42). In addition, there may have been a Bill of
Sale or other papers. Hardman delivered none of
these documents to Child. It was Hardman's understanding that the transaction was completed verbally except the paper work, which would be done
when they returned to Sunset (R. 31, 41). Hardman placed his dealer's license plates on the truck.
On cross-examination by counsel, Hardman
testified that he did not intend to transfer the title to
Child until they got home (R. 37). However, his subsequent testimony clearly establishes that by "title"
he meant a document or piece of paper as distin4
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guished from the property interest in the truck
(R. 38, 46, 48).
Hardman intended to take Child's note for the
$150.00 balance due on the purchase price (R. 4447).
Child drove the truck on the return trip from
Tooele. Hardman suggested they pass each other
occasionally (R. 32), which was the extent of the
conversation between Hardman and Child concerning the latter's operation of the truck (R. 32).
Shortly after leaving Tooele Hardman stopped his
vehicle. Child pulled up behind him and also stopped
( R. 34) . No signals or directions ·were given by
liardman to Child either before or after making
this stop (R. 34). After resu1ning the trip the collision occurred approximately one and one-half
n1iles ·west of the lVIorton Salt Plant on U.S. Highvvay 40.
STA.TEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES AS A MATTER
OF LAW THAT THE DEFENDANT NATHAN CHILD
WAS NOT DRIVING SAID PICKUP TRUCK AT THE
TIME OF THE ACCIDENT AS THE AGENT OR SERVANT OF THE DEFENDANT ARTHUR HARDMAN.
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS ON
THE LAvV AND BY FAILING TO SUBl\HT TO THE
JURY THE DEFENDANT HARDMAN'S THEORY OF
THE CASE.
5
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES AS A MATTER
OF LAW THAT THE DEFENDANT NATHAN CHILD
WAS NOT DRIVING SAID PICKUP TRUCK AT THE
TIME OF THE ACCIDENT AS THE AGENT OR SERVANT OF THE DEFENDANT ARTHUR HARDMAN.

'This case arose out of the same accident as
that of Walter Anderson vs. Arthur Hardman, dba
Hardman Auto Sales, Nathan Child and Barrus
Motor Company, No. 8580, now pending on appeal
in this Court. The evidence in each case on the question of agency or the right of Hardman to control
Child in the operation of the pickup differed only
in that in this case there was more detailed testimony from Hardman as to his intentions with respect to taking Child's note for the balance of the
purchase price (R. 44-49), which supports the appellant's contention that the ownership of the pickup had passed from Hardman to Child before they
left Tooele on the return trip to Sunset.
Section 41-1-72, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
provides that title to an automobile shall be deemed
not to have passed until the title is transferred in
accordance with the requirements of the Motor Vehicle Law. However, the decision of Jackson vs.
James, 97 Utah 41, 89 P. 2d 235, held that as between the parties themselves compliance with the
statute was unnecessary to transfer ownership. This
6
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decision was reaffirmed in Heaston v. Martinez, 3
Utah 2d 259, 282 P. 2d 833, where this Court again
recognized that delivery of the Certificate of Title
properly endorsed was not essential to a valid sale
of an automobile.
As stated in the Jackson v. James opinion,
supra:
"Section 69 provides for transfer of registration in certain cases by affidavit. It seems
therefore that Section 71 is not to be construed, as contended by appellant, as absolute and mandatory to pass a title. In the light
of the whole chapter, it is evident that its provisions were written to protect innocent purchasers and third parties from fraud, but
was not in tended to be con trolling as between
the parties to the transaction. It may well be
doubted that the Legislature could make mandatory any such formalities as a prerequisite
to transfer of title as between the parties. It
can, of course, prescribe such rules to be effective as to third parties and it may perhaps
provide that the registered title shall be an
element in determining liability for damages
resulting from the operation of the car, as
indicated by Section 76.
"Let us now devote a few minutes to a
more particular analysis of Section 71, the
section upon which appellant relies. It will be
noted from the italicized portion of the section quoted, supra, that the title shall be
deemed to be incomplete. These provisions are
not absolute, mandatory or controlling in
their application. They do not confer or deny
7
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substantive rights. They are procedural or
evidentiary in nature. They provide a flag
of warning to prospective transferees or encumbrancers, much as do the registry acts
relative to real estate or chattel mortgages.
Such was the effect given the statute in
Schwartz v. White, 80 Utah 150, 30 P. (2)
643."
Does the fact that Child was involved in an
accident out of which arose plaintiff's claim for
damages against him and Hardman change the situation so that ownership in the vehicle would not
pass between them but would pass if plain tiff's
claim did not exist? The same principles apply to
the sale of an automobile as to any other personal
property, irrespective of what happens to the vehicle after the transaction has occurred. This pickup was a specific piece of property. The automobile was in a deliverable state. The repairs requested
by Child had been made ( R. 28). The purchase
price had been agreed on ( R. 30 and 40). Hardman
would not have paid Barrus Motor Company for
the truck unless assured by Child that he would
take it (R. 27 and 31-32). Hardman's reluctance
to pay for the truck unless Child accepted it beforehand is borne out by the fact that the vehicle Hardman did take from Barrus and was towing to Sunset when the accident happened was on consignment
(R. 41). If the mutual understanding of Hardman
and Child had not been that Child had purchased
8
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the truck, would not Hardman have also taken possession of the pickup under consignment? The Uniform Sales Act adopted by Utah, Sections 60-2-2
and 60-2-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, relating
to transfer of property and title, apply to this situation:
"60-2-2. Property and specific goods
passes when parties so in tend. ( 1) Where
there is a con tract to sell specific or ascertained goods, the property in them is transferred to the buyer at such time as the parties to the contract intend it to be transferred.
" ( 2) For the purpose of ascertaining the
intention of the parties, regard shall be had
to the terms of the contract, the conduct of
the parties, usage of trade and the circumstances of the case.
"60-2-3. Rules for ascertaining intention.- Unless a different intention appears,
the following are rules for ascertaining the
intention of the parties as to the time at which
the property and the goods is to pass to the
buyer;
"Rule ( 1) Where there is an unconditional contract to sell specific goods in a deliverable state, the property in the goods
passes to the buyer when the contract is made,
and it is immaterial whether the time of payment, or the time of delivery, or both, is postponed.
"Rule ( 4) * * *
(b) Where in pursuance of a con tract to
sell the seller delivers the goods to the buyer,
9
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or to a carrier or other bailee (whether named by the buyer or not) for the purpose of
transmission to or holding for the buyer, he
is presumed to have unconditionally approppriated the goods to the contract, except in
cases provided for in the next rule and in
Section 60-2-4. (Rule 5 and Section 60-2-4
not applicable).* * *"
In Jones v. C. I. Trust, 64 Utah 151, 228 P.
896, it was held that title to a new vehicle passed
to the purchaser upon the happening of a condition
subsequent. That is, the sale of the old car for
$1,500.00 by the dealer, to apply upon the purchase
price. This Court clearly states the principle as
follows:
"A sale involves a present transfer of
the title in the goods from the seller to the
buyer. A contract to sell implies that the
ti tie in the goods remains vested in the seller
and is to be transferred to the buyer at some
future time. Whether a contract is one of sale
or an executory contract to sell depends always upon what the parties to it intend in regard to the time when the title in the property
is to go to the buyer. If they intend the title
to be transferred when the contract is made,
it is a contract of sale; otherwise it is a contract to sell. The intention of the parties is
the important and controlling fact to be considered and given effect in determining the
nature of a con tract in this regard. There
may be a sale, a present passing of the title,
notwithstanding that by the terms of the
agreement the right to the possession of the
thing sold is retained by the seller until the
10
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purchase price is paid. The intention must be
determined from a consideration of the nature and terms of the con tract, usages of
trade, the conduct of the parties and the circumstances of the case. If no contrary intention appears from such a consideration, then
the law presumes, where the contract pertains to a specific chattel, in a deliverable
state, that the parties intend the title to pass
when the contract is made, and this is true
regardless of the fact that payment of the
price or delivery of the goods, or both, be postponed.
The foregoing propositions are elementary. They are to be found in the provisions
of the Uniform Sales Act, Comp. Laws of
Utah, 1917, ss. 5110, 5127, 5128, Rule 1 (citing cases.)

* * *
"The parties to the con tract now under
consideration seem not to have expressed any
intention whatever in regard to when the
title in the new Cleveland sedan should vest
in Jones. They say nothing about that matter
in the conversation on the morning of October 8th, nor in any of the correspondence
which passed between them. Jones agreed, in
effect, that he would buy the new sedan and
pay $1875.00 for it, if and when the sales
company sold his old car for $1500.00 net to
him, the proceeds of the sale to that amount
to apply upon the price of the new car, and
that he would pay the balance of $375.00 when
he took possession of the new car. Both parties understood and intended that the sales
company should retain the right to the possession of the sedan until the entire purchase
11
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price was paid. The company did sell the old
car for more than the amount which Jones
asked for it and received the money, so that
Jones, as a result of that transaction, in fact
paid $1500.00 which is all that he claims in
this action, toward the price of the new sedan.
To all intents and purposes, the situation
was then the same as if Jones had stepped
into the sales company's office and handed
over $1500.00 in money as a part payment on
the automobile, then on exhibition in the
showroom, and said that he would return
within a few days and pay the balance of
$375.00 and take the new car."
This decision was cited with approval in the
later case of Taylor v. Daynes, 118 Utah 61, 218
P. 2d 1069. See also Davis v. Semloh Hotel, Inc., 86
Utah 318, 44 P. 2d 689.
The evidence of a present sale and transfer
of the ownership of title in this vehicle is even
stronger than Jones v. C. I. Trust, supra, because
in this situation there was no condition subsequent
upon which the title to the automobile should pass,
such as the sale of the purchaser's automobile, but
rather, it was intended by the parties that ownership should pass to Child before Hardman paid
Barrus for the pickup. The ownership of the pickup at the time of the accident is only germane to
the question of whether there was any evidence to
support the issue that Hardman had the right to
control Child in the operation of the pickup, but
12
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even if we assume that ownership had not passed
to Child, his status would be that of a bailee or a
prospective purchaser, which would not establish
a presumption of or constitute evidence that he had
the right to control the manner in which Child drove
the truck.
There is a long line of Utah decisions holding
that ownership raises no presumption of agency or
control in the owner. Galarowicz v. Ward, 230 P. 2d
576, 119 Utah 611, reaffirms this principle and refers to earlier Utah decisions.
The fact that the owner of a car may benefit
from the operation of a car by another, does not
make the former the bailee's agent. Conklin v.
Walsh, 113 Utah 276, 193 P. 2d 437.
The complaint alleges that Child was driving
the truck as the agent or servant of Hardman, however, the issue of whether Child was a servant or
employee was apparently abandoned by plaintiff,
and the court did not submit the issue to the jury
in his instructions. The test of whether the relationship of principal and agent exists is set out
succinctly in Fox v. Lavender, 89 Utah 115, 56, P.
2d 1049, as follows:
"The test of whether one is the agent of
the other depends upon the right of control
of one over the other. The same principles
of agency apply to the running of an automobile as apply to any other field of action.
13
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The fact that the automobile is capable of
causing so much damage has led the court,
sometimes unwillingly, to depart from the
fundament! principles of principal and agent
in order to hold owners responsible, the
thought in the minds of the court being that
more responsibility should be visited upon
the owner of such an instrument because of
the potentialities of mischief."

* * * * *

"Many cases have loosely used such expressions such as 'for and on behalf' or 'in the
business of,' or 'for the benefit of.' As stated
before, the inquiry must be directed to the
question of agency in the operation of the
car rather than to the question of agency
for the accomplishment of some ultimate
purpose."
The same principle is discussed in Dowsett v.
Dowsett, 116 Utah 12,207 P. 2d 809:

"* * * 'An agent who is not subject to
control as to the manner in which he performs the acts that constitute the execution
of his agency is in a similar relation to the
principal as to such conduct as one who agrees
only to accomplish mere physical results. For
the purpose of determining liability, they are
both 'independent contractors' and do not
cause the person for whom the enterprise is
undertaken to be responsible * * *.' "
Hardman, not being in the pickup, could exercise no physical control oYer it and even if we
adopt plaintiff's theory that he had an interest in
having Child drive the truck to Sunset in order
14
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that sales documents could be executed and arrangements be made for payment of the purchase price,
such does not make Child his agent in the manner
in which Child drove the truck. Before leaving
Tooele Hardman suggested to Child that they pass
each other occasionally ( R. 32) , a usual admonition
between drivers on a trip so that if trouble develops
one may assist the other. When they made a temporary stop after leaving Tooele Hardman gave
Child no instructions either to stop or in driving
the remainder of the trip to Sunset (R. 35).
If Child was a prospective purchaser, he was
still acting in his own benefit, and the relationship
between them was bailor and bailee. 31 A.L.R. 2d
1455. Plaintiff may contend that the relationship
between them was that of joint venture, however,
the basis for that relationship is contractual and
the use of the vehicle must be in furtherance of the
business objective provided for in the contract. Derrick v. Salt Lake & Ogden Ry. Co., 50 Utah 573, 168
P. 335, in which it was held that joint venture
existed. Said the court:
"The contractural relations of plaintiff
and his traveling companions were substantially the same as they would have been if
they jointly hired an automobile with which to
make the trip, with the understanding that
they would jointly pay the expenses and mutually and concurrently direct the journey and
the details thereof. The trip was therefore
15
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a joint enterprise in which these parties had
a community of interest and in which they all
equally had a voice and a right to be heard
respecting the details of the journey. Under
these circumstances the negligence of Merritt
in the management of the automdbile at the
time of the collision was imputed to plaintiff."
There was no evidence of such an arrangement
between Hardman and Child. See also the case of
Foxley v. Gallagher, 55 Utah 289, 185 P. 77.
The principles of law applicable were further
elaborated upon in the case of Fox v. Lavender,
supra, which involved an action brought against a
wife riding in an automobile owned by the husband
and wife for injuries arising out of an accident
which occurred while the automobile was being driven by the husband on an errand for the wife. Even
under those facts the court held that they were not
engaged in a joint venture. The fact that the wife
was a joint owner and had a common destination,
did not in and of itself make it a joint venture."
The fact that Child and Hardman were not in
joint possession of the automobile at the time of
the accident is important in determining whether
Hardman had the right to control the vehicle. Judge
Wolfe in the Fox vs. Lavender opinion makes some
16
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further interesting comments on the law of joint
venture. He quotes from Coleman vs. Bent, 100
Conn. 527, 124 Atl. 224:
"What sort of an arrangement will make
the parties to it joint adventurers in the operation of a vehicle in which all are riding is
well settled. A typical case is where two or
more jointly hire a vehicle for their common
purpose and agree that one of their number
shall drive it. In such a case the possession of
the vehicle is joint and each has an equal right
to control its operation. The better considered
cases hold that such common possession and
common right of control, resulting in common
responsibility for negligent failure to control are the earmarks of the legal relation
of a joint adventure in the operation of a
vehicle."
The Restatement of the Law of Torts, Vol. 2,
Sec. 491, states the effect of joint enterprise on
contributory negligence as follows:
''Any one of several persons engaged in
an enterprise is barred from recovery against
a negligent defendant by the contributory
negligence of any other of them if the enterprise is so far joint that each member of the
group is responsible to the third person injured by the negligence of fellow members."
Could it be contended reasonably that if the defendant Hardman had collided with the automobile
in which the plaintiff was riding, that the defendant Child would have joint liability with Hardman
17
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for the operation of the latter's vehicle? The situation as shown by the evidence seems to compel a
negative answer.
The transaction between Hardman and Child
was complete before they left Tooele. The only further interest Hardman had in the matter was to
obtain his money from Child when they reached
Sunset. He did not attempt to control Child in the
operation of the vehicle, nor did he have any right
to do so.
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS ON
THE LAW AND BY FAILING TO SUBMIT TO THE
JURY THE DEFENDANT HARDMAN'S THEORY OF
THE CASE.

The court's specific instructions which the defendant Hardman believes are erroneous are set out
as follows:
"Instruction No. 10
"This is an action by Ida M. Johnson,
administratrix of the estate of C. Tennyson
Johnson, deceased, to recover on behalf of herself as the widow, and Don Allen Johnson, a
son of deceased, damages for the death of the
deceased C. Tennyson Johnson, the husband
and father of the above mentioned persons.
"In her complaint plaintiff alleges that
that on the 20th day of December, 1954, C.
Tennyson Johnson was a passenger in an
automobile being driven by George W. Wil18
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Iiams in a westerly direction on U. S. Highway No. 40, approximately eight miles west
of the limits of Salt Lake City; she alleges
that defendant Child as agent of defendant
Hardman was driving a pickup truck in an
easterly direction on said highway; she alleges that said defendant negligently drove
said truck at an excessive speed on the left side
of the highway at a time when the highway
was not free of oncoming traffic and such
negligence proximately caused the death of
C. Tennyson Johnson; plaintiff alleges that
the death of said C. Tennyson Johnson has
caused his widow and child general damages
in the sum of $75,000.00 and funeral and
burial expenses in the sum of $828.23.
"Defendants in their answers deny that
they were negligent and deny that the widow
and children of C. Tennyson Johnson have
been damaged, as a result thereof.
"The foregoing is not to be taken by you
as a statement of the evidence introduced in
this case but it is merely a statement of the
contentions of the parties as disclosed by their
pleadings."
"Instruction No. 12
"You are instructed that under the laws
of this state, ownership interest in personal
property passes at the time the parties to the
contract intended for it to be transferred;
and unless a different intention appears from
the evidence, ownership passes to a purchaser
when the contract of purchase is completely
agreed upon. Unless the seller gives credit to
the purchaser, the purchaser is not entitled to
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the possession of personal property until he
tenders payment therefor.
"If you find from the evidence that at
Tooele, Utah, the defendant Child, after an
inspection of the truck at the Barrus Motor
Company's place of business, expressed his
satisfaction with it and said he would buy it
and pay therefor six hundred and fifty dollars plus the trade in value of his Ford automobile, five hundred dollars of which he was
to pay when the parties returned from Tooele
to Sunset, Davis County, Utah, and the balance of one hundred and fifty dollars at a
later date; and if you further find that defendant Hardman paid Barrus Motor Company of Tooele for the truck and delivered the
san1e to Child pursuant to said agreement
without an intention to retain any further
interest in said truck, then you are instructed
that at the time of the accident defendant
Child and not defendant Hardman was the
owner of the truck, and Hardman was not
responsible for its operation -on the way to
Sunset, Utah."
"Instruction No. 13
"You are further instructed that if you
find from a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant Hardman and the defendant Child had not entered into completed agree1nent e1nbracing all the terms
of how the truck was to be finally paid
for and that the defendant Hard~an did not
intend to relinquish absolutely all of his interest in and to the pick-up truck, then I instruct you that title to said truck had not
finally passed to defendant Child and would
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be in the defendant Hardman. You are further instructed that if the defendant Hardman requested the defendant Child to drive
said pick-up truck to Sunset, Utah, where the
con tract would be finally determined, then
and in that event the defendant Hardman
would be responsible for the manner in which
the defendant Child drove the truck between
Tooele and Sunset, Utah."
We appreciate that Instruction No. 10 purports
to set out the contentions of the parties, however,
it does not do so in that it omits the denial of Hardman that Child was his agent. Neither Instruction
12 nor 13, which deal with the relationship between
them, mention the issue of agency. Both of these
latter instructions tell the jury in substance that if
they found that Hardman in tended to retain any
interest in the truck, that ownership in the same
did not pass to Child.
In none of the instructions was the jury informed that Hardman denied that Child was his agent
or that he was responsible for the manner in
which Child drove the truck. From all that appears
in the instructions, the jury could and undoubtedly
did assume that as the details of the transaction
were not completed in all respects, including every
detail, Hardman was responsible for Child's conduct.
In no instruction was the jury told that for the
negligence of Child to be imputed to Hardman the
latter must have the right to control the manner in
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which the truck was driven. The word "control"
is not mentioned anywhere in the instructions.
Reading the instructions in their entirety, as
we must do, compels the conclusion that Hardman's
theory of defense was not submitted to the jury,
which was prejudicial error. It was the duty of
the trial court to cover the theory of all parties in
the instructions. Startin v. Madsen, 120 Utah 631,
237 P. 2d 834. Exceptions covering the foregoing
were taken by the defendant Hardman (R. 219222).
Instruction No. 12 incorrectly states the law
in that the jury is told that ownership in personal
property does not pass unless the contract of purchase is "completely" agreed upon, which is contra
to Sections 60-2-2 and 60-2-3, Utah Code Annotated
1953. Section 60-2-3, Rule (1), for ascertaining the
intentions of the parties, provides:
"Rule ( 1) Where there is an unconditional contract to sell specific goods in a deliverable state, the property in the goods passes
to the buyer when the contract is made, and
it is immaterial whether the time of payment,
or the time of delivery, or both, is postponed."
A jury of laymen would undoubtedly interpret
the word "completely" to mean that in order for
ownership to be transferred the payment, including the terms, would have to be discussed and agreed
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upon between the parties down to the minute details. The evidence was undisputed that the purchase price was $650.00 plus Child's old car.
In paragraph three of the instruction the jury
was told that in order to absolve Hardman from
responsibility for Child's operation of the truck they
must find that Hardman delivered the same to
Child without "an intention to retain any further
interest in said truck." It is submitted that even
if Hardman had intended to retain a seller's lien
for the unpaid balance of the purchase price, such
would not prevent the property interest from passing to Child subject to the lien. What type of "interest" does the court refer to? These men were
friends. Certainly Hardman had a friendly interest
in Child's reaching his destination with the truck.
Under this instruction the jury may have concluded
that such an interest was sufficient to make Hardman liable for Child's conduct. Exceptions were
taken to this instruction ( R. 220).
~nstruction

No. 13 again tells a jury that if
they find that "defendants Hardman and Child had
not entered into a completed agreement embracing
all of the terms of how the truck was to be finally
paid for and that the defendant Hardman did not
intend to relinquish absolutely all of his interest in
and to the pickup truck", title had not finally passed
to defendant Child and would be in the defendant
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Hardman. This part of the instruction reiterates
and re-emphasizes the statement in Instruction No.
12 that there must be a "completed agreement" (the
word "completely" is used in No. 12) and reiterates
in positive terms that if Hardman did not intend
to relinquish "absolutely" all of his interest in the
truck, title to the vehicle did not pass to Child. This
instruction is susceptible to the same objections as
No. 12 in that it is contra to the law as provided
in Sections 60-2-2 and 60-2-3 Utah Code Annotated
1953.

The two instructions tend to over emphasize
plaintiff's theory that ownership had not passed to
Child. The use of the word "absolutely" makes it
extremely improbable, if not impossible, for a jury
to find for the defendant Hardman on this issue.
The last sentence of Instruction No. 13 is erroneous as it makes Hardman responsible for Child's
negligence if the jury finds he was the owner of the
truck, which is contra to the established principle
of law that the negligence of a bailee is not imputable to a bailor.
It seems to us that Instructions No. 10, 12 and
13, and particularly the sense in which the words
"completed", "completely", and "absolutely" are
used in the latter two instructions virtually directs
the jury to find that ownership in the truck had not
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passed to Child and that because of that fact alone
Hardman is liable for Child's negligence.
If these instructions correctly state the law,
relationship of principal and agent is created between every person who sells a car under a Conditional Sales Contract and the buyer. It is common
practice for a purchaser to drive a car with the
dealer's "stickers" until he receives a Certificate
of Title from the State Motor Vehicle Department.
Defendant Hardman's exceptions to Instructions
No. 12 and 13 are found on pages 220-223 of the
Record.
CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that the evidence establishes as a matter of law that Child was not
Hardman's agent in the manner in which he drove
the pickup truck, and the verdict should be set
aside and a judgment of no cause of action entered
in favor of the defendant Hardman or, in the alternative, he should be granted a new trial because
of prejudicial error in the court's instructions.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON, BALDWIN & ALLEN

Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant Arthur Hardman
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